Source: www.MNNonline.org
Date: March 6, 2024
https://www.forum18.org/archiv
By Dmytro Vovk, @VovkDmytro
On 5 March, the parliamentary Committee on Humanitarian and Information
Policy stated that a draft Law that aimed to close religious organisations
(associations) affiliated with "centres of influence of religious
organisations or associations with ruling centres" in "states conducting
armed aggression against Ukraine" has been prepared for second reading by
Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada.
Parliament has not yet set a date for the second reading of the law, whose
prime target is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is historically
and ecclesiastically affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow
Patriarchate (ROC) (see below).
If it passes through the second reading, the draft Law would require a
third reading to be finally approved. The third reading might immediately
follow the second one. Once the draft is finally approved, it would be sent
to the President. The President could either sign it into law, or veto it
and return it to the Verkhovna Rada with his objections and proposed
amendments. The Verkhovna Rada could then either implement the President's
amendments, or reject the veto by a constitutional majority. This is either
two thirds of the 450 deputies, or 300 deputies (see below).
Proponents of the draft Law advocate for its adoption based on the UOC's
connections with the ROC, the endorsement by some in the UOC of Vladimir
Putin's war against Ukraine, and UOC involvement in the dissemination of
the "Russian world" (Russky mir) ideology. This is a set of Russian
chauvinist and imperialist ideas defining Ukraine as a territory of
Russia's influence and calling for Russian control of Ukraine (see below).
The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights is among the
human rights defenders who have expressed concern about the previous
February 2023 draft of the Law. Among their criticisms is that there is no
legally-admissible evidence that the ROC guides or compels the UOC as an
institution to commit crimes (see below).
Even were such evidence to exist, a total ban of an entire religious
community (with over 8,000 separate legal entities on territory under the
Ukrainian government's control) simply for having historical or
ecclesiastical links with the ROC would be a disproportionate punishment.
Stripping a religious community of legal status can in international law
happen only when less restrictive measures cannot adequately address
security concerns (see below).
"Denial of legal personality or de-registration of a religious or belief
community should not be based on alleged threats to security, but be
clearly based on evidence of illegal acts by the religious or belief
community in question," as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE)'s Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: Policy
Guidance notes (see below).
Ukraine's existing criminal and other public law already allows for the
prosecution of any individual and entity involved in illegal activities,
such as collaboration with the Russian army and secret services. As the
OSCE's Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: Policy Guidance notes:
"Any wrongdoings on the part of individuals should, therefore, be addressed
through criminal, administrative or civil proceedings against that person,
rather than directed at the religious or belief community as a whole" (see
below).
The draft Law would also prohibit the operation of any Russian religious
organisation that in any form supports the Russian aggression, and
specifically bans the operation of the ROC (Article 3 of the draft) as well
as two types of Ukrainian religious entities (see below).
This list of criteria for banning is highly problematic, and seems
excessively burdensome for the UOC and its communities. First, as in the
previous February 2023 draft, the affiliation criteria would not require
the state to prove any illegal behaviour on the part of the UOC as a whole
or its communities. Second, the affiliation criteria refer to facts which
are beyond the UOC and its communities' control as a ground for the
dissolution of the UOC (see below).
Third, the requirement for UOC clergy to publicly in writing decline any
ROC appointments or membership, and "make all necessary acts, prepare all
necessary notifications and other documents for termination of their
appointment and breaking ties" with the ROC is excessive. It should also be
noted that some UOC clergy in Russian-occupied territories have come under
pressure from occupation forces not to make such statements and have a
reasonable fear of occupation force reprisals. Instances of UOC clerics'
collaboration with the Russian occupying authorities were also reported
(see below).
Among the other problems with the draft Law, it would also allow the
banning of religious organisations affiliated with Russia for any other
"violations regarding the establishment and operation" of these
organisations. The draft law does not clarify whether these violations
should be significant or harmful to other persons or society. This
potentially allows almost unlimited room for arbitrary state actions
against UOC communities that decide not to leave the UOC.
The current draft Law – including the procedural aspects of dissolution
and requirement for religious "expert" analysis - does not conform to
Ukraine's international human rights obligations to respect and protect the
freedoms of religion or belief, expression, and association (see below).
The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has
not received a request from the Ukrainian authorities to review the draft
law, but would be "very willing" to do so if asked, Katya Andrusz, ODIHR's
spokesperson, told Forum 18 from Warsaw on 6 March.
Draft Law approved for second reading
In October 2023, Ukraine's Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, adopted in the
first reading a draft Law that aimed to close religious organisations
(associations) affiliated with "centres of influence of religious
organisations or associations with ruling centres" in "states conducting
armed aggression against Ukraine". That draft imposed an obligation on the
government state to prove any such affiliation in court. The prime target
of the law is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is historically
and ecclesiastically affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow
Patriarchate (ROC).
On 5 March 2024, the parliamentary Committee on Humanitarian and
Information Policy, which is responsible for the draft Law, stated that the
amended draft Law has been prepared for its second reading.
Parliament has not yet scheduled the second reading. If passed in its
second reading, the draft Law would require a third reading to be finally
approved. The third reading might immediately follow the second one. Once
the draft is finally approved, it would be sent to the President. The
President could either sign it into law, or veto it and return it to the
Verkhovna Rada with his objections and proposed amendments. The Verkhovna
Rada could then either implement the President's amendments, or reject the
veto by a constitutional majority. This is either two thirds of the 450
deputies, or 300 deputies.
Proponents of the draft Law advocate for its adoption based on the UOC's
connections with the ROC
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
some in the UOC of Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine, and UOC
involvement in the dissemination of the "Russian world" (Russky mir)
ideology. This is a set of Russian chauvinist and imperialist ideas
defining Ukraine as a territory of Russia's influence and calling for
Russian control of Ukraine.
The ROC and its leadership has actively supported Putin's aggression
against Ukraine (https://www.forum18.org/archi
the Russian government has pressured other Russian religious leaders to
support Putin's aggression against Ukraine
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Russian occupation officials have often threatened religious leaders if
they refuse to renounce their allegiance to religious bodies occupation
forces do not like. These include religious communities of any faith which
remain part of communities with their headquarters in Ukrainian
government-held territory
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
This has led to the killing of Ukrainian religious leaders who resists such
pressure, most recently between 13 and 15 February 2024 59-year-old Fr
Stepan Podolchak (https://www.forum18.org/archi
the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in Kalanchak in Russian-occupied
Kherson Region.
In all, at least 30 Ukrainian clerics of different religious communities
have been murdered
(https://risu.ua/en/in-the-pas
since the beginning of the Russian full-scale aggression.
Proponents of the Ukrainian draft Law also refer to the Security Service of
Ukraine (SBU) having reported about 70 cases of UOC clerics (including
bishops) justifying Russian aggression against Ukraine
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
religious hatred, and collaboration with Russian occupation forces. Several
UOC clerics have already been given jail sentences and then exchanged with
Russia (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng
exchanges. While some cases related to national-security-related crimes,
such as collaboration with the Russian-military, others related to
incitement of religious hatred or the public dissemination of Soviet
symbolic prohibited in Ukraine.
According the Registry of Court Decisions, as of 5 March 2024 courts had
handed down verdicts in 36 criminal cases against UOC clerics. These
included two cases against a former cleric, and 12 cases for incitement to
religious hatred (usually against the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine).
Other cases involved crimes against the constitutional order and
territorial integrity of Ukraine, treason, collaboration with the Russian
occupation authorities, unauthorised sharing of information about Ukrainian
military forces, and public and non-public justification of Russian
aggression.
However, since February 2022 courts have handed down over 2,000 verdicts in
such cases. For example, courts of the first instance had handed down
verdicts on over 620 treason cases (only 1 against a UOC cleric) and 150 on
unauthorised sharing of information about Ukrainian military forces (only 1
against a UOC cleric).
Evidence?
The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights
(https://www.ohchr.org/en/stat
Volker Türk is among the human rights defenders who have expressed concern
about the February 2023 draft of the Law. Among their criticisms is that
there is no legally-admissible evidence that the ROC guides or compels the
UOC as an institution to commit crimes
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Even were such evidence to exist, a total ban of an entire religious
community (with over 8,000 separate legal entities
(https://opendatabot.ua/analyt
the Ukrainian government's control) simply for having historical or
ecclesiastical links with the ROC would be a disproportionate punishment.
Stripping a religious community of legal status can in international law
happen only when less restrictive measures cannot adequately address
security concerns.
This could mean that deprivation of legal status of a religious community
can legally happen only when the entire leadership or the majority of
members – not just individual leaders or members – are directly
involved in illegal activities. "The fact that some individuals engage in
such [illegal] acts is not an indication that an entire religious or belief
community shares these views or condones these activities," as the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s Freedom of
Religion or Belief and Security: Policy Guidance
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
"Denial of legal personality or de-registration of a religious or belief
community should not be based on alleged threats to security, but be
clearly based on evidence of illegal acts by the religious or belief
community in question," as the OSCE Freedom of Religion or Belief and
Security: Policy Guidance
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
this "can only be contemplated in cases of grave and repeated violations of
endangering public order and if lighter sanctions, such as a warning, a
fine or withdrawal of tax benefits, cannot be applied effectively".
Ukraine's existing criminal and other public law already allows for the
prosecution of any individual and entity involved in illegal activities,
such as collaboration with the Russian army and secret services. As the
OSCE Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: Policy Guidance
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
wrongdoings on the part of individuals should, therefore, be addressed
through criminal, administrative or civil proceedings against that person,
rather than directed at the religious or belief community as a whole."
March 2024 amended draft Law
On 5 March 2024, the parliamentary Committee on Humanitarian and
Information Policy, which is responsible for the draft Law, stated that the
amended draft Law has been prepared for the second reading. In the amended
version, the draft starts with a preamble emphasising the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC)'s support for the Russian aggression and "numerous facts of
illegal acts of the ROC and religious organisations subordinated to it in
Ukraine".
The draft Law also prohibits the operation of any Russian religious
organisation that in any form supports the Russian aggression, and
specifically bans the operation of the ROC (Article 3 of the draft) as well
as two types of Ukrainian religious entities:
1. organisations (associations) affiliated, directly or via other entities,
with the ROC;
2. organisations involved in disseminating "Russian world" ideology. The
draft also provides more detailed regulations of legal procedures applied
to these organisations.
A religious organisation (association) is considered as affiliated with the
ROC if it fits one of the following seven criteria:
1. It is incorporated, directly or indirectly, in the ROC;
(Indirect incorporation means incorporation in any entity, religion,
non-profit or for-profit established, owned or run by the ROC and
organisations affiliated with the ROC.)
2. Its charter or official documents or decisions of ruling bodies contain
provisions regarding its incorporation in the ROC;
3. The ROC's charter or official documents or decisions of its ruling
bodies contains a provision recognising the Ukrainian organisation
(association) as a part of its structure, and the right of ROC charter
ruling bodies to adopt binding decisions on organisational or
ecclesiastical issues regarding the Ukrainian organisation (association);
4. ROC charter or official documents or decisions of its ruling bodies
contains a provision regarding the mandatory appointment of a Ukrainian
organisation's (association's) leaders or representatives to ROC charter
ruling bodies.
(This criterion does not apply if all these leaders or representatives
publicly and in writing decline their appointment and "make all necessary
acts, prepare all necessary notifications and other documents for
termination of their appointment and breaking ties" with the ROC.)
5. The ROC can influence administrative decisions or activities of a
Ukrainian organisation (association) due to its ecclesiastical or
organisational subordination to the ROC;
6. The ROC appoints, elects, confirms, approves, or blesses the head of a
Ukrainian religious organisation (association);
7. The ROC adopts, confirms, approves, blesses, or permits the charter of a
Ukrainian organisation (association).
In addition, the draft law allows the banning of religious organisations
whose officials have convicted of crimes against the national security of
Ukraine, or for committing crimes related to public and non-public
justification of the Russian aggression, incitement of religious hatred,
fraud, money or property laundering, terrorism, propaganda of war,
propaganda of Communist and Nazi regimes, genocide and mercenaries. The
draft law requires, however, that there must be proof that these crimes
were committed on behalf of the religious organisation.
Problematic and burdensome requirements
This list is highly problematic, and seems excessively burdensome for the
UOC and its communities.
First, as in the previous February 2023 draft
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
criteria do not require the state to prove any illegal behaviour on the
part of the UOC as a whole or its communities. The fact of any form of
ecclesiastical or documentary connection with the ROC would be enough for
the UOC and its affiliated entities to be prohibited, even if they have as
entities committed no crimes.
This contradicts the international human rights law noted above, which
requires a state to punish provable illegal behaviour on the part of
individuals, but not religious communities which cannot be proved to have
committed crimes. Also as noted above, deprivation of legal status can be
used only as a measure of last resort when other measures are not available
or ineffective.
Second, the affiliation criteria refer to facts which are beyond the UOC
and its communities' control as a ground for the dissolution of the UOC.
These include the ROC charter and other documents, its decisions and
actions. The UOC declared its independence from the ROC
(https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2
2022, but it is highly unlikely that the ROC will accept this decision. The
Ukrainian state seems to prefer to rely on ROC documents instead of UOC
documents in defining the current status of the UOC. Under this logic, if
the draft Law is adopted, it would only be necessary for Moscow Patriarch
Kirill to give his "blessing" to any UOC cleric for the Ukrainian state to
initiate the procedure for the UOC's dissolution.
Third, the requirement for UOC clergy to publicly in writing decline any
ROC appointments or membership, and "make all necessary acts, prepare all
necessary notifications and other documents for termination of their
appointment and breaking ties" with the ROC is excessive. If the Ukrainian
state has reliable evidence that certain UOC clerics are involved in the
operation of ROC bodies and support Russian aggression, the state can apply
Ukrainian criminal law to punish these clerics. But if the state has no
evidence of UOC clergy's actual participation in ROC bodies and support for
Russian aggression, the demand for UOC clergy to publicly and in writing
condemn the ROC is legally unenforceable – even if it is politically
desirable or morally justified.
It should also be noted that some UOC clergy in Russian-occupied
territories have come under pressure from occupation forces not to make
such statements (https://www.forum18.org/archi
have a reasonable fear of occupation force reprisals. For example, Fr
Kostiantyn Maksimov, a UOC priest, has been serving in the Church of the
Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the city of Tokmak in Ukraine's
Zaporizhzhia Region. Tokmak has been under Russian occupation with the
beginning of the renewed invasion in February 2022. In May 2023 Russian
occupation forces disappeared Fr Kostiantyn
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
forces have refused to give any information since on whether he is alive or
dead.
Artyom Sharlay, the head of the Russian occupiers' Religious Organisations
Department at Zaporizhzhia Regional Administration's Social and Political
Communications and Information Policy Department, claimed to Forum 18
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
had not wanted the Berdyansk Diocese of the UOC to move to be an integral
part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The Russian Orthodox Church took
over the UOC Diocese in May 2023, just days before Fr Kostiantyn was
seized. Sharlay did not explain why his claims about Fr Kostiantyn's views
on the affiliation of his Diocese could justify the occupation forces'
enforced disappearance of him.
Occupation officials pressured another local UOC Church priest, Fr Vladimir
Saviisky of St Nicholas Church in Primorsk, in 2023 to accept the transfer
of the Berdyansk Diocese from the UOC to the ROC. He refused
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
It is not legally supportable for the Ukrainian state to require the
dissolution of the UOC if a UOC cleric – for example a priest living
under Russian occupation – does not publicly and in writing condemn the
ROC and support for Russian aggression.
Fourth, the draft Law uses terms - such as "influence", "blessing", "all
necessary acts", "ecclesiastical issues" - which are too vague and broad
for legal certainty – especially in the context of the heavy punishments
imposed by the draft Law. For example, the criteria refer to ROC's ability
to influence or control UOC communities due to their ecclesiastical
relationship with the ROC and the ROC charter. This grants the state almost
unlimited discretion in deciding which UOC community should be banned and
when, and is – again – based on the ROC's view of the UOC rather than
the UOC's view of itself.
Fifth, even if we agree with the Ukrainian state that the UOC is
institutionally subordinated to the ROC, the concept of loss of legal
status as a punishment for ecclesiastical or historical links is internally
contradictory. The state argues that these links with the ROC makes UOC
communities dangerous for national security.
If UOC communities which are not involved in any kind of illegal behaviour
are dangerous enough to be liquidated, formal separation from the ROC
(which the UOC already decided on in May 2022
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
any less dangerous. And if a formal declaration condemning the ROC (even
were it to be insincere or intentionally false) or departure from the ROC
makes UOC communities safe, they cannot have been dangerous in the first
place.
Finally, the draft law also allows the banning of religious organisations
affiliated with Russia for any other "violations regarding the
establishment and operation" of these organisations. The draft law does not
clarify whether these violations should be significant or harmful to other
persons or society. This potentially allows almost unlimited room for
arbitrary state actions against UOC communities that decide not to leave
the UOC.
The "Russian world" ideology
The draft Law defines the "Russia world" ideology as a Russian neo-colonial
doctrine grounded in chauvinist, Nazi, racist, xenophobic, religious ideas,
images and goals, the destruction of Ukraine, the genocide of the Ukrainian
people, and non-recognition of the sovereignty of Ukraine and other
countries. "Russian world" ideology is also defined as aiming at the
violent expansion of the Russian supranational imperial space as a tool of
the special civilisational right of Russians to mass murder, state
terrorism, military interventions in other countries, the occupation of
territories, the expansion of the canonical territory of the Russian
Orthodox Church beyond the territory of the Russian Federation.
Many of the concepts are expressed in such confusing and vague language
(eg. "neo-colonial doctrine", "civilisational right to mass murders") that
they lack legal precision and so are difficult to legally apply.
According to the draft Law, a religious organisation involved in multiple
dissemination of the "Russian world" ideology or its parts shall be
deprived of legal status. The draft states that the dissemination can be
committed by the organisation itself as well as its ruling bodies, or any
other person that acts on behalf of this religious organisation and
expresses approval for "Russian world" ideology in any form.
The Ukrainian state has a strong legitimate interest in preventing the
spreading of Russian propaganda, including the justification of Russia's
unprovoked attack on Ukraine. However, it is unclear why the state needs to
specifically prohibit the "Russian world" ideology when the Ukrainian
Criminal Code already prohibits:
- public denial of the Russian aggression (Article 111-1);
- propaganda for the war (Article 436);
- non-public justification, legitimisation, and denial of Russia's military
aggression against Ukraine and glorification of its participants (Article
436-2);
- and spreading ethnic and religious hatred (Article 161).
As criminal cases initiated by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)
against UOC clerics, and even more against other persons, indicate, the
state is already able to effectively use the existing Criminal Code to deal
with these issues.
Many legal systems contain provisions prohibiting public dissemination of
certain ideologies, such as Nazism, Communism, or Holocaust denial.
However, such legal prohibitions are usually implemented against ideologies
or facts which can be relatively clearly and precisely described and
explained. The "Russian world" ideology is not among them. While it is
clear that Putin's regime utilises the ROC and Moscow Patriarch Kirill's
statements as weapons in its renewed invasion of Ukraine, the content and
scope of the "Russian world" ideology remains a matter of much debate.
Philosophical, theological, and political opinions on it vary from seeing
it as a comprehensive doctrine to seeing it as a superficial construction
to provide an excuse for invasion.
As this "Russian world" ideology is vague and imprecise, there is a
reasonable chance that the legal application of its prohibition might be
too broad and arbitrary. Would an ROC icon of Tsar Nicholas II and his
family (canonised by the ROC) on the wall of a church constitute propaganda
of the "Russian world"? Would the dedication of a church to a medieval
Russian saint be seen as praising the "Russian world"? Would a statement
that Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy have a shared tradition constitute
"Russian world" propaganda?
Even though some speeches and actions might be morally inappropriate in
times of war, these examples all constitute legitimate forms of expression
and yet might be punished under the draft Law.
Procedural aspects of dissolution
The draft Law provides the Ukrainian State Service for Ethnic Policies and
Freedom of Conscience (SEPFС) with the power to investigate whether a
religious organisation is affiliated with the ROC. Once any affiliation is
found, the SEPFC issues an order requiring the breaking of ties with the
ROC within 30 days. The term can be extended up to 90 days in total.
In addition, religious organisations recognised by the SEPFC as affiliated
with the ROC are prohibited to rent state- or locally-owned properties;
their rental contacts are automatically terminated. These organisations are
also not allowed to sell, exchange, pledge, and place under management
their property, unless they break their ties with the ROC and join a
different religious association.
If the SEPFC order is not executed, the SEPFC bring a deprivation of legal
status case to court. Similarly, the SEPFC can also initiate court cases
against religious organisations involved in "Russian world" propaganda.
According to the draft Law, all cases regarding the deprivation of legal
status of religious organisations shall be considered by the appellate
administrative court in Kyiv (now the Sixth Appellate Administrative
Court). This means that, in order to be represented in the court, every
religious organisation in every Ukrainian region will have to send its
representatives to Kyiv, otherwise the case will be considered in absentia.
The draft Law also allows public prosecutors to be involved in deprivation
of legal status cases on behalf of the Ukrainian state. Practically, it
means that the SEPFC (which has limited resources) will be supported by
public prosecutors to speed up the process of deprivation of legal status
of religious organisations affiliated with the ROC.
If a religious organisation is liquidated, all its property (except
religious property) becomes the property of the state.
Religious "expert" examination
The draft Law stipulates that State Service for Ethnic Policies and Freedom
of Conscience conclusions on the affiliation with the ROC, or the
dissemination of "Russian world" propaganda, can be based on "religious
expert examinations".
In many post-Soviet states, including in Belarus
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Crimea (https://www.forum18.org/archi
Asian states such as Kazakhstan
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
are often used to justify freedom of religion or belief and other human
rights violations, including jailing prisoners of conscience.
The concept of state religious examinations of ecclesiastical and
theological issues is problematic in international human rights law. As the
OSCE / Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on the Legal
Personality of Religious or Belief Communities
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
should refrain from a substantive as opposed to a formal review of the
statute and character of a religious organisation."
In international law "the state must respect the autonomy of religious or
belief communities when
fulfilling its obligation to provide them with access to legal
personality," as the Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or
Belief Communities note. "In the regime that governs access to legal
personality, states should observe their obligations by ensuring that
national law leaves it to the religious or belief community itself to
decide on its leadership .. the structure of the community .. Considering
the wide range of different organizational forms that religious or belief
communities may adopt in practice, a high degree of flexibility in national
law is required in this area."
The SEPFC's group of experts, in their opinion published on 1 February 2023
(https://dess.gov.ua/vysnovok-
state that the Moscow Patriarchate does not recognise the UOC as fully
independent, and that there is no evidence that UOC leader Metropolitan
Onufry has left the ROC's Synod. In addition, the group emphasises that no
other Orthodox church recognises the UOC as an independent (autocephalous)
church, and the UOC has not sought this status. The group concludes that
the UOC remains a part of the ROC.
If the Ukrainian Government acts on this conclusion, all UOC communities
are already recognised as entities affiliated with the ROC. This means that
they can be deprived of legal status in line with the procedure laid out in
the draft Law.
The UOC has challenged the impartiality
(https://news.church.ua/2023/0
of some of the members of the SEPFC's group, claiming that they have a
previous record of hostility to the UOC. The UOC also stated that these
members belong to the rival major Orthodox church in Ukraine, the Orthodox
Church of Ukraine (OCU).
Current draft Law does not conform to Ukraine's international human rights
obligations
If the draft Law is adopted in its current version, it would prove that the
Ukrainian state has decided to take a hard line in dealing with the UOC. In
addition to prosecuting clergy, believers, and communities involved in
security-related crimes, the state would target all UOC communities for
ecclesiastical and historical links with the ROC.
The draft Law would legitimise the large-scale and relatively fast
deprivation of legal status of UOC communities. Even before the deprivation
of legal status, these communities would face the deprivation of the right
to rent state- and locally-owned properties. This would both legitimise
past decisions by local councils in some regions to deprive UOC communities
of the right to rent land or property, and would force UOC organisations to
leave several state-owned historically significant religious premises
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Lavra in Ternopil Region.
Under the threat of deprivation of legal status and loss of their
properties, UOC communities would have few options—either to switch to a
different Orthodox church (in the great majority of cases to the Orthodox
Church of Ukraine (https://www.forum18.org/archi
or operate as an informal, non-registered community labelled as
"suspicious".
The draft Law would also significantly increase the role of the state in
inter-religious relations, and expand the SEPFC's powers in monitoring and
controlling religious communities and the expression of religious ideas.
However, this expansion would come with insufficient legal protections
against arbitrary use of the SEPFC's newly acquired power.
Without careful addressing these concerns, the draft Law cannot implement
Ukraine's legally-binding international obligations to respect and protect
the freedoms of religion or belief, expression, and association.
- Dmytro Vovk (https://twitter.com/VovkDmytr
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. He also runs the Center for the Rule
of Law and Religion Studies at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in
Ukraine and teaches law at Ukrainian Catholic University. (END)
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(https://www.forum18.org/archi
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