Source: www.forum18.org
Date: September 17, 2024
https://www.forum18.org/archiv
By Dmytro Vovk, @VovkDmytro, and Elizabeth A. Clark, @ProfEAClark
On 24 August, Ukrainian Independence Day, Ukraine's President Volodymyr
Zelensky announced that he had signed Law No. 3894-IX banning the Russian
Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) as well as Ukrainian
religious organisations affiliated with the ROC. The Law comes into force
on 23 September. In his speech the same day he signed the Law, Zelensky
stated that Ukrainian Orthodoxy had made a step "towards liberation from
Moscow devils".
President Zelensky's signature follows parliamentary debates since March
2022 (https://www.forum18.org/archi
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is historically and
ecclesiastically linked to the Moscow Patriarchate. Law No. 3894-IX
(https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/law
government a legal tool to ban religious organisations it thinks are
Moscow's collaborators in Ukraine. Although Law No. 3894-IX does not
specify these organisations, the Law's main target is clearly the UOC.
The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) did
not receive a request from the Ukrainian authorities to review the draft
Law (https://legislationline.org/l
willing to do so if asked", ODIHR spokesperson Katya Andrusz told Forum 18
from Warsaw on 6 March 2024.
Similarly, the Council of Europe's Venice Commission told Forum 18 that it
had not received a request to review the draft Law
(https://www.venice.coe.int/We
Main provisions of the Law
The Law bans the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) for
its justification and proactive support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
the ROC as a part of the Russian state and an accomplice, a partner in the
war crimes committed by the Russian regime. It also establishes a legal
mechanism to liquidate Ukrainian religious organisations which are either
affiliated with the ROC, or affiliated with a religious organisation
affiliated with the ROC. Affiliations with other Russian religions
supporting the Russian aggression against Ukraine are also prohibited. The
language of the Law – especially the criteria defining ROC affiliation
¬– makes it clear that the main target is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
(UOC).
While banning the ROC is mostly symbolic, as the ROC could not easily
operate in Ukraine even without the ban, the legal consequences for
religious organisations affiliated with the ROC such as the UOC are real.
After the Law comes into force on 23 September 2024, they will be deprived
of the right to use state-owned religious properties and ordered to cut
their ties with the ROC by the State Service for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom
of Conscience (DESS). If they do not cut their connections to the ROC, they
will be banned by court order.
In addition, the Law permits the banning of religious organisations whose
officials have been convicted of either:
- national security crimes against Ukraine;
- or committing crimes related to public and non-public justification of
the Russian aggression, incitement of religious hatred, fraud, money or
property laundering, terrorism, propaganda of war, propaganda of Communist
and Nazi regimes, genocide, or mercenaries.
This wide-ranging justification allows the banning of UOC communities whose
clerics have been sentenced for the above-mentioned crimes, including cases
of treason, collaboration and the justification of the Russian aggression,
but also cases where Ukraine courts convicted defendants of claims of
religious superiority or criticism of state favouritism of a particular
religious group. Such statements, which in international law are protected
by the right to freedom of speech, have been found by Ukrainian courts to
be "spreading religious hatred"
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
The Law also prohibits the so-called "Russian world" (Russky mir) ideology
that claims Russia's control, both political and spiritual, over Ukraine.
Religious organisations involved in the repeated dissemination of this
ideology will also be banned. This institutional involvement is understood
broadly. If an individual priest or the head of the parish council is found
to have propagated Russian world ideology in any form, the law claims that
the whole organisation is involved and can therefore be banned.
Much of the Law's definition of "Russian world" is expressed in such
confusing and vague language (eg. "neo-colonial doctrine", "civilisational
right to mass murders") that the definition lacks legal precision and so is
difficult to legally apply. It is also unclear why such a ban on this
concept is necessary when Ukrainian law already bans spreading Russian
propaganda and justifying Russia's invasion (see below).
International law and evidence of UOC institutional involvement in illegal
activities
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(https://www.ohchr.org/en/inst
(ICCPR) prohibits the limitation of religious freedom based on national
security. Religious organisations that constitute a threat to national
security (for example, institutional collaboration with the Russian army)
can be banned based on ICCPR Article 22 ("Freedom of association").
However, this ban cannot rest on purely religious grounds such as
ecclesiastical connections. The state must provide legally-admissible
evidence proving that, due to these connections, a religious organisation
is involved in illegal activities.
In its assessment of the draft of the Law (as of February 2023), the United
Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk (among other
human rights defenders) expressed concern
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
2023 draft of the Law. Among other criticisms is that there is no
legally-admissible evidence
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) guides or compels the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) as an institution to commit crimes.
Even were such evidence to exist, a total ban of an entire religious
community (which in the case of the UOC has over 8,000 separate legal
entities (https://opendatabot.ua/analyt
territory under Ukrainian government control) simply for having historical
or ecclesiastical links with the ROC would be a disproportionate
punishment. Stripping a religious community of legal status can happen in
international law only when less restrictive measures cannot adequately
address legally-legitimate security concerns.
This could mean that deprivation of legal status of a religious community
can legally happen only when the entire leadership or the majority of
members – not just individual leaders or members – are directly
involved in illegal activities. "The fact that some individuals engage in
such [illegal] acts is not an indication that an entire religious or belief
community shares these views or condones these activities," as the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s Freedom of
Religion or Belief and Security: Policy Guidance
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
The OSCE Policy Guidance goes on to state: "Denial of legal personality or
de-registration of a religious or belief community should not be based on
alleged threats to security, but be clearly based on evidence of illegal
acts by the religious or belief community in question." It adds that this
"can only be contemplated in cases of grave and repeated violations of
endangering public order and if lighter sanctions, such as a warning, a
fine or withdrawal of tax benefits, cannot be applied effectively".
There is also insufficient evidence that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
(UOC) has been institutionally involved in undermining Ukraine's national
security. After almost two years from 2022 of intensive investigations of
UOC activities, there have so far been over 40 court verdicts against UOC
clerics and 100+ criminal cases that are either being investigated or being
considered by courts. Most of these cases deal with inappropriate speech
– religious hatred and justification of Russian aggression
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
prosecutions have not been opened when the speech is directed against the
UOC (https://www.forum18.org/archi
While these are significant numbers, it is still difficult to argue that no
other way exists to address this issue other than to liquidate the whole
Church of 10,000 clerics.
Ukraine's existing criminal and other public law already allows for the
prosecution of any individual and entity involved in illegal activities,
such as collaboration with the Russian army and secret services. As the
OSCE's Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: Policy Guidance
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
wrongdoings on the part of individuals should, therefore, be addressed
through criminal, administrative or civil proceedings against that person,
rather than directed at the religious or belief community as a whole."
The Law's definition of ROC affiliation
According to the Law, a religious organisation (association) is considered
as affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate
(ROC) if it fits one of the following seven criteria:
1) It is incorporated, directly or indirectly, in the ROC. (Indirect
incorporation means incorporation in any entity, religion, non-profit or
for-profit established, owned or run by the ROC and organisations
affiliated with the ROC);
2) Its charter or official documents or decisions of ruling bodies contain
provisions regarding its incorporation in the ROC;
3) The ROC's charter or official documents or decisions of its ruling
bodies contain a provision recognising the Ukrainian organisation
(association) as a part of its structure, and the right of ROC charter
ruling bodies to adopt binding decisions on organisational or
ecclesiastical issues regarding the Ukrainian organisation (association);
4) The ROC charter, official documents, or decisions of its ruling bodies
contain a provision regarding the mandatory appointment of a Ukrainian
organisation's (association's) leaders or representatives to ROC charter
ruling bodies. (This criterion does not apply if all these leaders or
representatives publicly and in writing decline their appointment and "make
all necessary acts, prepare all necessary notifications and other documents
for termination of their appointment and breaking ties" with the ROC.)
5) The ROC can influence administrative decisions or activities of a
Ukrainian organisation (association) due to its ecclesiastical or
organisational subordination to the ROC;
6) The ROC appoints, elects, confirms, approves, or blesses the head of a
Ukrainian religious organisation (association);
7) The ROC adopts, confirms, approves, blesses, or permits the charter of a
Ukrainian organisation (association).
Problematic and burdensome requirements
This list is highly problematic and seems excessively burdensome for the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and its local communities.
First, the affiliation criteria do not require the state to prove any
illegal behaviour on the part of the UOC as a whole or its communities. The
fact of any form of ecclesiastical or documentary connection with the
Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) is enough for the UOC
and its affiliated entities to be prohibited, even if they have as entities
committed no crimes.
This contradicts international human rights law, as noted above, which
requires a state to punish provable illegal behaviour on the part of
individuals, but not religious communities which cannot be proved to have
committed crimes. Also as noted above, deprivation of legal status can be
used only as a measure of last resort when other measures are not available
or ineffective.
Second, the affiliation criteria refer to facts which are beyond the UOC
and its communities' control as a ground for the dissolution of the UOC.
These include the ROC charter and other documents, its decisions, and
actions.
The UOC declared its "full independence" from the ROC
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
is highly unlikely that the ROC will accept this decision. The Ukrainian
state seems to prefer to rely on ROC documents instead of UOC documents in
defining the current status of the UOC. Under this logic and in the formal
accordance with the Law, it is only necessary for Moscow Patriarch Kirill
to give his "blessing" to any UOC cleric for the Ukrainian state to
initiate the procedure for the UOC's dissolution.
It is hard to see how the Law can recognise any break of affiliation with
the ROC as permanent. Even if the UOC decides to somehow self-declare its
autocephaly (full ecclesiastical independence), from a legal perspective
this will still not be enough for UOC communities to avoid dissolution. As
noted already, mere recognition at any time of the UOC by the ROC as a part
of the Moscow Patriarchate is enough under the Law for the UOC to be seen
as affiliated with the ROC – even if the UOC denies this claimed ROC
affiliation and states that it is an autocephalous church.
Third, the requirement for UOC clergy to publicly in writing decline any
ROC appointments or membership, and "make all necessary acts, prepare all
necessary notifications and other documents for termination of their
appointment and breaking ties" with the ROC is excessive.
If the Ukrainian state has reliable evidence that certain UOC clerics are
involved in the operation of ROC bodies and support Russian aggression, the
state can apply Ukrainian criminal law to punish these clerics. But if the
state has no evidence of UOC clergy's actual participation in ROC bodies
and support for Russian aggression, the demand for UOC clergy to publicly
and in writing condemn the ROC is legally unenforceable – even if it is
politically desirable or morally justified.
It should also be noted that some UOC clergy in Russian-occupied
territories have come under pressure from occupation forces not to make
such statements and have a reasonable fear of occupation force reprisals.
For example, Fr Kostiantyn Maksimov, a UOC priest, was serving in the
Church of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the city of Tokmak
in Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Region. Tokmak has been under Russian occupation
since the beginning of the renewed invasion in February 2022. In May 2023
Russian occupation forces disappeared Fr Kostiantyn, apparently because he
opposed the occupation forces' forced transfer of the UOC's Berdyansk
Diocese to the ROC (https://www.forum18.org/archi
In August 2024, at a closed trial held at the Russian-controlled Crimean
Supreme Court in Simferopol, he was found guilty of alleged "espionage" and
sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
labour camp.
Russian occupation forces also in 2023 pressured another local UOC priest,
Fr Vladimir Saviisky, to accept the forcible transfer of the Berdyansk
Diocese from the UOC to the ROC
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
forced to leave Russian-occupied Ukraine.
Fourth, the Law uses terms – such as "influence", "blessing", "all
necessary acts", "ecclesiastical issues" ¬– which are too vague and
broad for legal certainty – especially in the context of the heavy
punishments imposed by the Law. For example, the criteria refer to the
ROC's ability to influence or control UOC communities due to their
ecclesiastical relationship with the ROC and the ROC charter. This grants
the state almost unlimited discretion in deciding which UOC community
should be banned and when. This is – again – based on the ROC's view of
the UOC rather than the UOC's view of itself.
The Law's criteria also ignore the evidence, noted above, that the ROC has
failed to control all UOC priests in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory
– even when the ROC's failed attempts have been backed by Russian
occupation forces.
Fifth, even if we agree with the Ukrainian state that the UOC is
institutionally subordinated to the ROC, the concept of loss of legal
status as a punishment for ecclesiastical or historical links is internally
contradictory. The state argues that these links with the ROC make UOC
communities dangerous for national security. If UOC communities are not
involved in any kind of illegal behaviour and the mere fact of historical
or canonical ties make them dangerous enough to be liquidated, formal
separation from the ROC (which the UOC announced in May 2022
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
communities any less dangerous. Indeed, if a formal declaration condemning
the ROC (even if insincere or intentionally false) or departure from the
ROC makes UOC communities safe for the Ukrainian state, the communities
cannot have been dangerous in the first place.
Finally, the Law also allows the banning of religious organisations
affiliated with Russia for any other "violations regarding the
establishment and operation" of these organisations. The Law does not
clarify whether these violations should be significant or harmful to other
or society. This potentially allows almost unlimited room for arbitrary
state actions against UOC communities that decide not to leave the UOC
after the UOC is, under the Law's questionable criteria, determined to be
affiliated with the ROC.
The "Russian world" ideology
The Law defines the "Russia world" ideology as: a Russian neo-colonial
doctrine - grounded in chauvinist, Nazi, racist, xenophobic, religious
ideas, images and goals - of the destruction of Ukraine, the genocide of
the Ukrainian people, and non-recognition of the sovereignty of Ukraine and
other countries.
"Russian world" ideology is also defined as aiming at the violent expansion
of the Russian supranational imperial space as a tool of the special
civilisational right of Russians to mass murder, engage in state terrorism
and military interventions in other countries, occupy territories, and
expand the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church beyond the
territory of the Russian Federation.
Many of the concepts are expressed in such confusing and vague language
(eg. "neo-colonial doctrine", "civilisational right to mass murders") that
they lack legal precision and so are difficult to legally apply.
According to the Law, a religious organisation involved in multiple counts
of dissemination of all or part of the "Russian world" ideology shall be
deprived of legal status. The Law states that the dissemination can be
committed by the organisation itself, as well as its ruling bodies, or any
other person that acts on behalf of this religious organisation and
expresses approval for "Russian world" ideology in any form.
The Ukrainian state has a strong legitimate interest in preventing the
spreading of Russian propaganda, including the justification of Russia's
unprovoked attack on Ukraine. However, it is unclear why the state needs to
specifically prohibit the "Russian world" ideology when the Criminal Code
already prohibits:
- public denial of the Russian aggression (Article 111-1)
- propaganda for the war (Article 436);
- justification, legitimisation, and non-public denial of Russia's military
aggression against Ukraine and glorification of its participants (Article
436-2);
- and spreading ethnic and religious hatred (Article 161).
As criminal cases initiated by the Security Service of Ukraine
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) clerics and the very much larger number of
cases against people not linked to the UOC
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
already effectively uses the existing Criminal Code to deal with these
issues.
Many legal systems contain provisions prohibiting public dissemination of
certain ideologies, such as Nazism, Communism, or Holocaust denial.
However, such legal prohibitions are usually implemented against ideologies
or facts which can be relatively clearly and precisely described and
explained. The "Russian world" ideology is not among them.
While it is clear that Putin's regime uses the Russian Orthodox Church –
Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) and its Patriarch Kirill's statements
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
renewed invasion of Ukraine, the content and scope of the "Russian world"
ideology remains a matter of much debate. Philosophical, theological, and
political opinions on it vary from seeing it as a comprehensive doctrine to
seeing it as a superficial construction to provide an excuse for invasion.
As this "Russian world" ideology is vague and imprecise, there is a
reasonable chance that the legal application of its prohibition might be
too broad and arbitrary. Would an ROC icon of Tsar Nicholas II and his
family (canonised by the ROC) on the wall of a church constitute propaganda
of the "Russian world"? Would the dedication of a church to a medieval
Russian saint be seen as praising the "Russian world"? Would a statement
that Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy have a shared tradition constitute
"Russian world" propaganda?
Even though some speeches and actions might be morally inappropriate in
times of war, these examples all constitute in international human rights
law legitimate forms of expression and yet might be punished under the Law.
Religious "expert" examination
The Law stipulates that State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of
Conscience (DESS) conclusions on the affiliation with the ROC, or the
dissemination of "Russian world" propaganda, can be based on "religious
expert examinations". The Law lays down no requirements for the
impartiality and professional competence of the "experts" appointed to
conduct an examination of affiliation with the ROC. So there is no legal
defence against their opinions being biased or incompetent.
The concept of state religious examinations of ecclesiastical and
theological issues is problematic in international human rights law. As the
OSCE / Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on the Legal
Personality of Religious or Belief Communities
(https://www.osce.org/files/f/
should refrain from a substantive as opposed to a formal review of the
statute and character of a religious organisation."
In many post-Soviet states, including in Belarus
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Crimea (https://www.forum18.org/archi
Asian states such as Kazakhstan
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
are often used to justify freedom of religion or belief and other human
rights violations, including jailing prisoners of conscience.
The DESS experts, in their opinion published on 1 February 2023
(https://dess.gov.ua/vysnovok-
state that the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) does
not recognise the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) as fully independent, and
that there is no evidence that UOC leader Metropolitan Onufry (Berezovsky)
has left the ROC's Synod. In addition, the group emphasises that no other
Orthodox Church recognises the UOC as an independent (autocephalous)
Church, and the UOC has not sought this status. The group concludes that
the UOC remains a part of the ROC.
The UOC has challenged the impartiality
(https://news.church.ua/2023/0
of some members of the DESS's group, claiming that they have a previous
record of hostility to the UOC. The UOC also stated that these members
belong to the rival major Orthodox church in Ukraine
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
of Ukraine (OCU).
Procedural aspects of dissolution
Once the Law comes into force on 23 September 2024, the DESS can start
investigating the affiliation of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)
communities with the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC).
The DESS can (but is not required) to conduct a religious "expert"
examination to prove the affiliation, and is allowed to use any sort of
evidence to confirm this affiliation. This can include information provided
by other state bodies, private individuals and entities, the media, and any
other open sources. As the 2023 DESS examination already stated that the
UOC is affiliated with the ROC, it can be expected that a new DESS
examination will reach the same conclusion.
While each UOC community (parishes, monasteries, educational institutions
etc.) are separate legal entities, the state does not have to prove that
each community is affiliated with the ROC. It is enough to prove the
affiliation of the UOC ruling centre (the UOC Kyiv Metropolitanate). This
means that, under the Law, other UOC entities will automatically be
considered as affiliated with the ROC if they are subordinated to the UOC
Kyiv Metropolitanate.
If ROC affiliation is stated by the DESS, it will issue an order to UOC
entities to cut their ties with the ROC. They will have 30 days to do so
(which can be extended by up to 60 days). If UOC communities rent state- or
municipally owned properties, these contracts must be terminated after the
DESS states the communities are affiliated with the ROC.
If the order to cut ties with the ROC is not fulfilled, or a UOC
organisation is suspected to be involved in the dissemination of the
Russian world ideology, the DESS will bring a suit to court. The Law
establishes a new, simplified procedure for considering these cases. All
cases against UOC communities will fall under the jurisdiction of one court
– the Kyiv-based Appellate Administrative Court. In addition, the Law
allows not only the DESS but also public prosecutors to submit lawsuits
about the dissolution of religious organisations affiliated with the ROC.
The court is allowed to notify religious organisations involved in the case
simply by placing an announcement on the Ukrainian judiciary's official
website (https://court.gov.ua/) and the DESS website
(https://dess.gov.ua/), without any other form of notification. Even if
religious organisations are not aware from these websites that a case has
been brought against them, the court can consider cases even if religious
organisations do not come to the court.
This gives the state a relatively effective and fast legal mechanism to
either ban all 8,000 UOC communities or at minimum liquidate its ruling
bodies (the UOC Kyiv and regional metropolitanates) – even if the
religious organisations did not receive a mail notification about the case
and did not monitor the websites and so become aware of any case.
The simplified court procedure for this type of case is postponed for nine
months from the Law coming into force on 23 September 2024. This means that
the first cases against UOC organisations can be submitted to the court in
May 2025. However, the DESS can in 2024 start identifying UOC communities
as affiliated with the ROC, and start the process of depriving them of
rented state- or municipally owned properties, even though any court
decisions about the dissolution of UOC communities will not appear before
2025.
If a religious organisation is liquidated, all its property (except
religious property) becomes the property of the state.
Impact of the Law, does not conform to international human rights
obligations
The Law does not comply with international standards of freedom of religion
or belief. It bans Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) communities for their
ecclesiastical, actual, or state-claimed links to the Russian Orthodox
Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), without any obligation for the state
to prove that these communities or the whole Church are institutionally
involved in crimes.
The Law legitimises the large-scale and relatively fast deprivation of
legal status of UOC communities. The law is impossible for the UOC to
comply with. Among other reasons for this, the Law requires the ROC to
remove UOC-related provisions from the ROC charter. This is beyond the
powers of the UOC to do, and the ROC is highly unlikely to do this in the
foreseeable future. This impossible demand of the Law allows the Ukrainian
government to deregister any UOC community at any time.
Even before the deprivation of legal status, these communities will face a
real threat of an extrajudicial deprivation of the right to rent state- and
municipally owned properties, which will eventually stop or restrict their
operation.
The Law also significantly increases the role of the state in
inter-religious relations and expands the DESS's and law enforcement
bodies' powers in monitoring and controlling religious communities and the
expression of religious ideas. This will potentially contribute to
increasing the number of state prosecutions of UOC priests and believers
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
religious policies.
The language of the Law and, especially, the discourse over its adoption,
has been vague and more politico-theological (eg. "spiritual independence"
of Ukraine) than genuinely evidence-based and in line with international
human rights law obligations. This can and is interpreted by government,
public and private actors as a signal to attack UOC communities and
believers.
After the adoption of the Law on 24 August 2024, this has already been seen
in:
- Rivne Regional Council's 28 August call to UOC parishes
(https://ror.gov.ua/novyny/obl
to execute the Law and "wash off the brand mark of Moscow slaves";
- in the 5 September decision
(https://www.facebook.com/OCUT
of the Council of Churches and Religious organisations under the Ternopil
Regional State Administration to exclude the UOC if they do not immediately
"reject [their] church jurisdiction [with the Moscow Patriarchate]";
- and in the 4 September announcement of Cherkasy National University
(https://cdu.edu.ua/news/zayav
that they had on 28 August expelled a student from a journalism course, and
on 27 August fired her mother from an Associate Professor post in the
Educational-Scientific Institute of International Relations, History and
Philosophy.
In the Cherkasy case, the University Rector also announced that the
authorities had been asked to investigate both for possible violations of
Criminal Code Article 110 "Actions against the territorial integrity and
inviolability of Ukraine", Article 111-1 "Public denial of the Russian
aggression", and Article 161 "Spreading ethnic and religious hatred". Local
media claimed that the daughter had supported the UOC
(https://novadoba.com.ua/43493
and criticised the OCU in strong language.
Finally, the law magnifies the state's growing favouritism of the OCU
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
relations. This favouritism now shows itself in encouraging and on the
local level often taking the lead in transferring UOC communities to the
UOC, and excluding the UOC from state-religion dialogue at both the central
and local levels of government.
State favouritism and bias is also seen in prosecutions of hate speech
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
against the OCU, but not prosecuting hate speech and violence against UOC
clerics and others. For example, as the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission
in Ukraine (HRMMU) documented after what it described as "a surge in hate
speech and several incidents of violence against UOC members in April 2023"
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
not effectively address the incidents of hate speech".
Addressing real national security threats, such as the involvement of UOC
priests and believers in collaboration with the Russian army or the
dissemination of Russian propaganda – as well as the much larger number
of such cases involving people not linked to the UOC - is a legitimate
concern of the Ukrainian government. However, Law No 3894-IX does not help
address those problems and may add to them by prosecuting people exercising
their human rights and banning their religious communities. The Law will
also not help preserve the religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism
championed by Ukraine since gaining independence in 1991.
- Dmytro Vovk (https://x.com/VovkDmytro) is a visiting professor at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. He also runs the Center for the Rule of
Law and Religion Studies at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in
Ukraine.
- Elizabeth A. Clark (https://x.com/ProfEAClark) is Associate Director of
the International Center for Law and Religion Studies at Brigham Young
University.
(END)
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